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Abstract: The purpose of the present note is to advertise an interesting conjec-
ture concerning a well-known translation in modal logic, by confirming a (highly
restricted) special case of the conjecture.
1  
We work with the conventional language of (mono)modal logic, taking 2 and
some functionally complete set of boolean connectives as primitive, to gener-
ate the set of formulas from the set of propositional variables, p1, . . . , pn, . . .
For p1 and p2 we generally write p and q. Given a formula A,  A abbreviates
the formula 2A∧A, and a formula in which all occurrences of 2 are in subfor-
mulas of the latter form will be called a  -formula. The boxdot translation, τ ,
from modal formulas to modal formulas replaces all occurrences of 2 with  .
According to a well-known result, this translation embeds KT faithfully in (or
‘into’) K in the sense that for all formulas A:
`KT A if and only if `K τ (A).
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Because of its simplicity, the boxdot translation has been a traditional favourite
in the philosophical literature on the significance of such embeddings, for ex-
ample, [7], [4] (and more briefly, by the same authors, in Example 2.9 of [8]
and §2 of [5]. Recent technical studies in which it figures prominently include
Goris [3] and Litak [6]; see also Zolin [10], Lemma 5.9. ([3] and [10] include
references to the literature on modal provability logic, in which again   and
τ  have enjoyed considerable currency.)
Now, experience with a considerable number of cases prompts the con-
jecture that the range of (normal: see below) modal logics in which τ  faith-
fully embeds KT—in the sense that reference to them can replace that to K
in the biconditional inset above—comprises precisely the logics S for which
K  S  KT.1 While it is not hard to see that τ  embeds KT faithfully into
all the logics between K and KT, and also (since `KT A $ τ (A) for all A) that
no proper extension of KT enjoys this status as a candidate ‘target’ for the em-
bedding (with KT as ‘source’), it is not so easy to see that only logics between
K and KT are suitable candidates. (We have informally circulated this problem
amongst several logicians with a special interest in modal translations, but none
has so far been able to provide a solution.) What, in particular, is there to rule
out the existence of a logic -incomparable with KT, in which KT is nonethe-
less embedded by τ ? According to the conjecture just outlined, no such logic
exists: τ  embeds KT only into sublogics of KT. “Logic”, here, means normal
modal logic;2 for these we use the labels of Chellas [1] where they exist, and in
general for a set of formulas Γ , S Γ is the smallest normal extension of S con-
taining all formulas in Γ . When Γ = {A} for some formula A, we write “S  A”
rather then “S  {A}”. In particular, then, K  A is the smallest normal modal
logic containing the formula A. In view of the facts about τ  cited above, the
conjecture amounts to the conjecture that for any non-theorem A, of KT ( =
K  T, in the notation just introduced), there is a K-unprovable  -formula B
with `KA B. As we may put it, the normal extension of K by any non-theorem
1Considerations from the Kripke semantics point in a similar direction, but since these have
proved suggestive rather than conclusive for us to date, they will not be in play explicitly in
what follows. The idea is that whenever A is not KT-provable, the reflexive closures of frames
on which A is valid will validate some formulas—the A* of the proof of Corollary 4 below—not
valid on every reflexive frame. Note that we do not say that A is valid on a frame if and only if
A* is valid on its reflexive closure—by analogy with the well-known fact that τ (A) is valid on a
frame iff A is valid on its reflexive closure. In fact, there can be no function g() from formulas
to formulas with the property that for all formulas A, A is valid on a frame iff g(A) is valid on
its reflexive closure, since different frames with the same reflexive closure need not validate the
same formulas.
2We are taking a normal modal logic to be a set of formulas in the language described above,
containing all the theorems of K and closed under Necessitation, Modus Ponens, and Uniform
Substitution. For such a logic S we write “`S A” for “A 2 S” and read this as: “A is provable
in (or: is a theorem of ) S”. Because of the Uniform Substitution condition, it doesn’t matter
whether we think of KT as the smallest normal modal logic containing the formula 2p ! p or
as the smallest such logic containing all instances of the schema 2A! A. Whereas Chellas [1]
uses T as the name of the schema, we use it as the name for the formula just mentioned.
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of KT is  -nonconservative. (Note that the  -formulas comprise precisely the
image of the translation τ .)
Massaged into the form just given, the conjecture clearly admits of no coun-
terexample in which A is of modal degree 0, since for such an A /2 KT, KA is
the inconsistent logic (as A is then a 2-free formula which is not a two-valued
tautology). In the following section, we shall extend this to cover the case of
formulas of modal degree 1—formulas, that is, in which no occurrence 2 lies
within the scope of another occurrence of 2. (On this convention a formula of
modal degree n is also of modal degree n + 1.) Evidently this is a considerable
limitation. The normal proper extensions of K axiomatizable by one-variable
first degree formulas are precisely KD, KDc, KD!, KT, KTc, KT!, K2? and the in-
consistent logic. Amongst first-degree formulas considered as axioms by which
to extend K without restriction as to the number of variables, the most famous
are perhaps those from the infinite sequence of formulas Altn (n 2 N) from
Segerberg [9], p. 52. This section concludes with some remarks on the general
case, without any restriction as to modal degree.
Sometimes when A /2 KT, we can see that K  A is not  -conservative
because its theorems include τ (A), and 0K τ (A). Examples include the cases
in which A is 4 ( = 2p ! 22p) or B ( = p ! 23p, where 3p is ¬2¬p), or Tc
( = p ! 2p). In other cases, 0KA τ (A), such as when A is 2?, 2? ∨32?,
or Dc ( = 3p! 2p, a minor variant of Segerberg’s Alt1); but here it is not hard
to find  -formulas other than τ (A) which are not K-provable but which are
of the form τ (B) for KT-unprovable B. (In the cases just mentioned, take B as
Tc, 3(2p∨2¬p), and p∨2(p! q)∨2(p! ¬q), respectively.) The function
f described in the following section applies to any first degree A to provide a B
with the desired behaviour.
2     
In any normal modal logic, a formula A is provably equivalent to a conjunc-
tion of disjunctions of formulas of the form ¬B ∨ ¬2C ∨ 2D1 ∨    ∨ 2Dn
in which B is 2-free, and for the case of A of modal degree 1, the formulas
C,D1, . . . , Dn are also 2-free;3 we will write such ‘basic disjunctions’ in the
implicational form:
(B∧2C)! (2D1 ∨   ∨2Dn),
in which the consequent is understood as ? when n = 0 and either or both
of the conjuncts in the antecedent may be absent.4 (If both are, we may think
3Fine [2] is the locus classicus for normal forms in (normal) modal logic. Fine takes 3 as
primitive rather than2, and (essentially) works with disjunctive rather than (as here) conjunctive
normal forms.
4We don’t need to write “2C1 ∧    ∧2Cm” in the antecedent, since by normality this sim-
plifies to 2(C1 ∧    ∧ Cm). In terms of the disjunctive formulation, this is why we have just
¬2C rather than ¬2C1 ∨   ∨ ¬2Cm.
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of the antecedent as > or, equivalently, identify the conditional with its conse-
quent.)
Whether or not a given A is a first degree modal formula, if A is written
as a conjunction A1 ∧    ∧ Ak with each Ai (1 6 i 6 k) a basic formula (as
inset above), we define f(A) to be the conjunction of the formulas f(Ai) where
f maps Ai, to the formula:
(s∧ B∧ C)! ( (D1 ∨ s)∨   ∨ (Dn ∨ s)),
in which s is a propositional variable not occurring in Ai (i.e. not occurring in
the given B,C,D1, . . . , Dn), and the  -notation is as explained in Section 1.
So defined, f(A) is not unique, since various different conjunctive normal
forms Vki=1Ai of A can make a difference, as well as the choice of s from
the countable list of propositional variables (see the opening sentence of Sec-
tion 1), though the first difference is inconsequential and the second could be
ironed out by choosing s for Ai as the first pj in that enumeration which does
not occur in Ai. Rather than making any such moves, however, we can sim-
ply take f(A) to denote an arbitrarily selected formula satisfying the defining
conditions.
 1 For any formulaA: `K A! f(A).
Proof: It suffices to observe that where Vki=1Ai is a normal form for A, we
have `K Ai ! f(Ai), for 1 6 i 6 k.
 2 For any formulaA of modal degree 1, if `K f(A) then `KT A.
Proof: As in the proof of Lemma 1, it suffices to check this for eachAi. TakeAi
as above, i.e., as (B∧2C)! (2D1∨   ∨2Dn), so that f(A) is (s∧B∧ C)!
( (D1 ∨ s)∨   ∨ (Dn ∨ s)). Our hypothesis is that this is provable in K, so
weakening the “ ”s in the consequent to simple “2”s, and unpacking the “ ”
in the antecedent (together with some re-arranging), we have:
`K ((s∧ B∧ C)∧2C)! (2(D1 ∨ s)∨   ∨2(Dn ∨ s)).
Since A, and therefore Ai, is of modal degree (at most) 1, s∧ B∧ C is a 2-free
formula, so, using the fact that K is a (fully) modalized logic in the sense of [10],
we can infer that either (a) `K ((s∧ B∧ C)! ? or (b) `K 2C! (2(D1 ∨ s)∨
  ∨2(Dn ∨ s)). In case (a) we have `K B! ¬C (after substituting B or > for
s), and therefore (since `KT 2C ! C) `KT B ! ¬2C, from which we conclude
that `KT Ai. In case (b) we have, substituting
Vn
i=1Di for s and simplifying:
`K 2C! (2D1 ∨   ∨2Dn), so `K Ai and therefore again `KT Ai.
Putting these ingredients together settles the conjecture of Section 1 inso-
far as it bears on first degree formulas:
 3 SupposeA is a first degree modal formula not provable in KT. Then KA
proves some -formula not provable in K.
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Proof: Let A be as described. We may choose f(A) as the desired  -formula,
since it is provable in KA, by Lemma 1 (and Modus Ponens), but not provable
in K, by Lemma 2 (contraposed).
For the first degree KT-unprovable formulas A listed at the end of Section
1, the formulas B given there as having B provable in K  A without τ (B)
provable in K are minor variations on what the definition of f(A) would deliver.
For example, for the case of A as 2? we gave as a candidate B the formula
p ! 2p. Since this A contains no propositional variables, taking s as the first
variable not occurring in A means that s is p (alias p1), and f(A) is therefore
p !  (? ∨ p), which is provably equivalent in K to p ! 2p. More generally,
since we may have to make substitutions, we can say for the proffered examples
of B that B and f(A) are K-interducible in the sense that KB = Kf(A).5 This
happens in the case of A = p! 2p in which again we gave B as p! 2p, while
f(A) is (p∧q)!  (p∨q) and we need to substitute p for q before proceeding
further.
Returning to the conjecture as first formulated in Section 1, we have the
following:
 4 If S = K  Γ for a set Γ of first degree formulas and S 6 KT, then
τ  does not embed KT faithfully in S.
Proof: Given that S 6 KT, pick A 2 Γ r KT, and the proof of Theorem 3 shows
that f(A) is a  -formula in K  A r K. Thus we have (1) 0K f(A) while (2)
`S f(A). Since f(A) is a  -formula, replacing every   in f(A) with 2 gives a
formula A* for which f(A) = τ (A*), and (1) and (2) can be reformulated as
(1 0): 0K τ (A*), (2 0): `S τ (A*). From the fact (recalled in Section 1) that τ 
embeds KT in K, we infer from (1 0) that 0KT A*. If it were also the case that τ 
faithfully embedded KT in S, (2 0) would imply that `KT A*: a contradiction.
What is wanted, then, is a way of lifting the restriction to first degree for-
mulas from Theorem 3 (and Corollary 4)—or else of showing, with a coun-
terexample, that it cannot be lifted. Should the former turn out to be possible,
perhaps the proof of Theorem 3 can be turned into the inductive step of a
proof of the desired general result (by induction on the modal degree of for-
mulas); however, we do not currently see how the details of such an argument
would go.
5Indeed, since the rule of necessitation is not required here, we could say more informatively
that K+B = K+ f(A), where S+ Γ is the smallest (not necessarily normal) modal logic extending
S and containing all formulas in Γ . In fact, everything said in Lemma 2 about KT applies to the
quasi-normal modal logic K + T ( = K[T]0 from [9], p. 179), suggesting a variant on Corollary 4
below in which the references to K Γ and KT are replaced by references to K+ Γ and K+ T, the
qualification “first degree” is dropped, and reference to τ  is replaced by a one to the transla-
tion τ0, where τ0(A) is the result of replacing only the outermost (i.e., not modally embedded)
occurrences of2 inA by . We do not go into this in any detail because of the marginal interest
of τ0 by comparison with τ .
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